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1.  INTRODUCTION
Following  the  seminal  work  of Becker  (1964),  it is  widely  accepted
in  the  literature  that  firms  will  be unwilling  to finance  training  which
workers  may  use in  other  firms. This  paper  takes  issue  with this  prediction
and  suggests  that  firms  will frequently  share  in the  cost  of such  general
training.'/
Becker  argues  that  a firm  which  pays  for  the  training  of  workers  in
skills  of potential  use  to other  firms  will  lose  these  workers: since  other
firms  bear  none  of the  costs  of general  training,  they  can  attract  a  worker
with such  training  by outbidding  the  firm  which  trained  him. Recognizing  this
absence  of  property  rights  over  an investment  in  general  training,  firms  will
refuse  to  provide  it. Hence,  if  general  training  is to  take  place,  the
trainee  will  have  to  pay for  it.  If  potential  trainees  are  unwilling  or
unable  to  pay,  general  training  will  not take  place. A shortage  in  general
training  is likely  to  emerge;  this  may  be especially  pronounced  in  developing
countries. 2/  In  contrast,  the  outlook  for  specific  training  (training  that  is
of  value  only in  the  firm  providing  it)  is  less  pessimistic,  since  firms  are
willing  to finance  such  training. Indeed,  it is  likely  that  specific  training
will  be a shared  investment  between  worker  and  employer. There  is  a  broad
literature  on  various  aspects  of sharing  specific  training  investments.)'  Yet
apart  from  an early  insight  by Eckaus  (1963),  the  possibility  of shared
worker-employer  investments  in  general  training  has received  but  scant
attention  in the  literature.A/
Implicit  in  Becker's  result  is the  view that  a  poached  worker  can
immediately  and  painlessly  start  working,  and  yield  full  value,  in  a job
commensurate  with  his training. Obviously,  this  approach  implies  neglig'ble
transactions  costs. In  particular,  Becker's  theory  seems  to  suggest  that  a- 2 -
potential  recruiting  firm  has full  information  regarding  training  carried  out
by other  firms. No costs  related  to the  absence  of information  are  admitted.
The  major  premise  of this  paper  is  that  potential  recruiters  do  not
possess  much  information  on the  extent  and  type  of  workers'  on-the-job
training. Workers  taken  for  trained  might  turn  out  to  possess  no, or  very
little,  general  training. Also,  a  worker  recruited  for  a given  job  may
possess  the  wrong  type  of general  training. All this  imposes  substantial
information-based  costs  on firms  that  recruit  rather  than  train. These  costs
include  opportunity  costs,  actual  expenses  and  increased  exposure  to  risk. As
a result,  a recruiting  firm  will  place  a lower  value  on a recruited  worker
with  general  training  than  the  firm  that  trained  him.  The  wages  paid  to such
a  worker  will  reflect  this  lower  value.
The  informational  asymmetry  between  a training  and  a  recruiting  firm
therefore  reduces  the  net  benefits  that  a  worker  with  general  training  can
obtain  by moving  to  another  firm. We shall  argue  that  this  implies  that  a
firm  may  find  it  feasible  to finance  part,  or all,  of a  worker's  general
training. Indeed,  under  certain  circumstances,  only  firms  will  be prepared  to
invest  in general  training: informational  asymmetry  considerations  may
reverse  the  predictions  of Becker's  model.
Section  2  considers  the  value  of a  worker  with  general  training  to
the  firm  thlat  trained  him.  The information  about  the  value  of such  a  worker
that  a recruiting  firm  is  likely  to  possess  is  then  examined. The  cost
implications  of informational  asymmetry  between  a training  and  a recruiting
firm  are  dis_ussed  in  Section  3.  Section  4  brings  together  the  main  strands
of the  argument  to show  that  firms  may  finance  part  or all  of its  workers'
general  training. Extensions  and  some  welfare  and  policy  implications  are
offered  in  Section  5.- 3 -
2.  THE  VALUE  AND  INFORMATIONAL  ASYMMETRY
OF  GENERAL  TRAINING
Traditionally,  the  benefits  of an investment  are  measured  by the  net
presentL  value  of the  income  that  the  investment  is  expected  to generate  in  its
intended  use. Recently,  it  has  become  recognized  that  the  benefits  of an
investment  include  the  options  it  provides  in the  face  of  random  shocks  and
changes. Hence,  the  value,  V, of an investment  in  general  training  is  made  up
of two  components:  Z, the  net  present  value  of the  training  for  the  intended
employment;  and  OV, the  less  familiar  options  value  of the  training. A brief
description  of  OV follows;  a simple  example  illustrating  the  principles  behind
valuing  an option  is  given  in  Appendix  1.
The  option  value  of general  training  may  have  several  components. 5-
For  example,  if the  need  arises,  a  worker's  general  training  may  be used  as  a
basis  for  advanced  training. Also,  training  for  one  job imparts  related
skills  that  enable  the  firm  to  employ  the  worker  at other  tasks. Perhaps  most
important,  a given  general  training  cat  enhance  a  worker's  ability  to  deal
with  certain  types  of  new technologies.fi
Thus,  workers  with  general  training  provide  their  training  firm  with
the  ability  to respond  efficiently  and  swiftly  to  various  potential  shocks  and
changes. Shifts  in  tastes,  changes  in  tech.ology,  the  sudden  departure  or
absence  of key  workers  are  but  a few  typical  shocks  which  general  training
options  might  accommodate.  The  value  of these  options  is  likely  to  be
considerable.  Indeed,  one  simulated  result  has  generated  option  values  (for
capital  investment)  that  exceed  100  percent  of the  cost  of the  investment  (see
Majd  and  Pindyck,  1987.)i-/
In the  following  section,  we suggest  that  the  value  of a  worker  to  a
firm  is  an increasing  function  of the  information  it  has  about  the  worker's
general  training. A  worker  with  general  traini  .i.hieves  his full  value  only- 4 -
in a firm that possesses full training information about him.  Hence, in order
to determine the  value of a worker with general training to different firms,
it is necessary to consider the information  available to such firms.
Specifically, the difference  between the information  about a worker's training
that is available to a training firm and to potential recruiting firms  plays a
crucial role in our results.  A
The above emphasis on the distinction  between Z and OV can now be
seen in terms of the main aim of this  paper.  The difficulty of discerning a
worker's Z will differ from the difficulty of determining  his OV.  The loss of
value due to absence of information  will, therefore,  vary with the relative
weights of Z and OV in a worker's general training.
General training is typically  provided on-the-job:  it is
heterogeneous, informal, and frequently tailored  for individual  workers.  This
non-standardization implies that, even for Z, certification  of training is
unlikely.  Nonetheless, a non-training firm  may, though at significant costs,
obtain information regarding  a worker's Z.  With time and careful observation
this information  will unfold.
However, general training  will also contain many nuances and
options, of %.;ich  even trainees  may not be fully aware.  Another firm  will
find it extremely difficult to determine the full extent of this,  more subtle,
component of general training.  The option value of a worker's training  can.
at best, be partially discovered.  Since the primary aim of poaching a worker
is to employ him at his intended tasks,  his general training options  will not,
in general, be observed.  Indeed,  a firm  which is unsure about some aspects of
a worker's training  may be loath to call upon him to carry out certain tasks.
His skills at such tasks may, therefore,  never be revealed.  Also, even if a
firm does wish to discover a worker's training options, it  may be forced (by-5-
the  observavion  time  required,  fcr  example),  to limit  itself  to  a small  subset
of the  (possible)  options  imbedded  in  his  training.
Informational  asymmetry,  then,  is  particularly  pronounced  and
intractable  for  the  option  values  of training. Hence,  the  informational
asymmetry  between  the  training  firm  and  other  firms  will  tend  to  be an
increasing  function  of the  options  component  in  general  training. Even  if the
options  component  is  small,  however,  there  will  still  be a  major  information
gap  between  the  firm  that  provides  the  training  and  other  firms.
3.  THE  VALUE  OF  A RECRUITED  WORKER
This  section  examines  the  information-based  costs  incurred  by a
recruiting  firm. Given  these  costs,  the  net  present  value  of a generally
trained  worker  to  a recruiting  firm,  VN,  is smaller  than  his  value,  VT,  to  his
training  firm. Let i  denote  the  number  of  periods  since  a  worker  has  been
recruited. Define  ViT  and  ViN  as the  value  in  period  i  a  worker  with
general  training,  to  the  training  and  recruiting  firms,  respectively.  In the
event  of full  discovery  over  time,  ZiN  would  increase  with  i.  Nonetheless,
given  the  intractability  of discovering  full  information  about  OVN,  ViN  will
fall  short  of ViT,  no matter  how  large  i  becomes.
The  matrix  in  Table  1 illustrates  the  loss  in  a worker's  value  due
to  the  information  asymmetry,  for  the  simple  case  of one  type  of  non-option
general  training  and  one  type  of  job  requiring  training. The  value  of a
worker  to  the  recruiting  firm  in  a time  unit  during  the  discovery  period, 21
depends  on the  job in  which  he is  placed  (requiring  or not  requiring
training),  and  on  whether  or not  the  worker  has  received  general  training.AQ/
In  Table  1,  K will  be the  largest  payoff  and  Q the  smallest. Q might  well  be
negative: placing  an  untrained  worker  in  a position  requiring  training  may  be
directly  wasteful  and  destructive.  Also,  if  the  values  of  workers  are-6-
interdependent,  as in  a production  line,  an untrained  worker can impose
negative  externalities  on other  workers,  potentially  causing  substantial
losses.
TABLE 1:  Z VALUE OF WORKER
JOB
Requires  I  Does  Not
Trained  Training  Require  Training
ER  Trained  K  R 
WORKER
i_Untrained  Q  S
If the  recruiting  firm  has no prior  knowledge  of the  probability
that  a recruit  has been suitably  trained,  it is likely  to  adopt a maximin
strategy.  Since  Q  is smaller  than  both R and S, this implies  that  the firm
will employ  all recruited  workers  at  jobs that  do not require  training. The
value Z  of a worker  with general  training  is (R-M-A)i,  where M is the cost
of monitoring  the  worker and  A is the  cost of the risk-averse  firm's  exposure
to risk.  In this  two-way  case,  the recruiting  firm  will  know after only  one
period whether  the  worker is trained  as it observes  outcome  R or outcome S.
It can then  place the  worker in  an appropriate  position.  However, it seems
very possible  that S and R are  equal so that information  can only  be obtained
by employing  the  worker  otn  a job requiring  training;  given th(t  possibility  of
Q, this  may be an unacceptable  risk  to the  firm.  Hence,  information  might
never surface  and recruiting  will  be effectively  blocked.
For several  reasons,  however,  the discovery  process  will  be
considerably  longer  and  more complex. A firm  is 1icely  to  need  workers  with
different  types  of general  training. The information  value of trying  a worker
out in a given  job, and finding  him untrained  for that  job, may  be very low.
Consider,  for example,  a firm  with one  job that  requires  no t.aining  and 1-7-
jobs  all  requiring  different  types  of general  training. Then,  if a  worker  is
not successful  at  job  1, say,  he might  be untrained,  or trained  in  one  of the
1-1  other  jobs.  Hence,  even  if  the  recruiting  firm  is,  ilt  principle,  prepared
to take  the  risk  of employing  an  unknown  worker  in  a  job  requiring  training,
the  probability  of failure  to  discover  much  information  is  likely  to  cause  it
to  desist. 1 J 1
Many  jobs involve  complex  tasks,  the  fulfillment  of  which  is
difficult  to  measure,  and  a worker's  Zi  might  not  be directly  observable.
Also,  many  jobs  are  carried  out  by teams  rather  than  individuals,  and  the
contribution  made  by a given  worker  is  hard to  discern. Furthermore,  even  if
a  worker  performs  a complete  job  by  himself,  his  product  will  depend  on the
effort  and  training  of  other  workers  and  inputs,  about  whom  there  may also  be
an absence  of information.  These  considerations  make it  likely  that  a  worker
will  have to  be observed  for  several  periods  to determine  his  Z.
Alternatively,  discovery  may  take  only  one  period,  but  this  period  will  be
long.  12/
The  values  in  Table  1  are  free  of random  components.  This
assumption  makes  discovery  appear  to  be easier  than  is  the  case.  In reality,
the  value  of a  worker  at a given  job  in.  any  one  period  is  a random  variable.
This  value  is,  in general,  a  drawing  frrm  a distribution  whose  parameters are
a function  of the  worker's  training  and  of the  job  requirements.  The
randomness  of  values  renders  the  recruiting  firm's  search  for  information
concerning  a worker's  general  training  more  difficult,  since  it  implies  that
the  firm  must  extract  information  about  a  worker's  training  by sampling. The
discovery  process  will  be lengthy  and  costly,  further  reducing  the  ZN of a
recruited,  trained  worker.L)/
In addition,  the  randomness  of the  individual's  zi is  more likely  to
act  as a total  barrier  on recruiting  trained  workers. Recall  that  to  blockrecruiting  in the  deterministic  case,  the  values  of  trained  and  untrained
workers  in  tasks  not  requiring  training,  had  to  be equal. In the  random  case,
recruiting  may  be blocked  even  if these  values  are  not  identical.  When E(R)
and  E(S)  are  not too  far  apart,  a recruiting  firm  gains  little  informaticn
from  each  period  of employing  an  unknown  worker  in  an untrained  capacity. To
be effective,  the  sampling  period  may  need  to extend  over  years. But,  the
longer  the  required  discovery  period,  the  greater  uill  be the  loss  incurred  by
a trained  worker. Workers  may, ther^fore,  refuse  jobs  which  do  not require
their  training. To expedite  the  process  of oub:aining  information  about
workers,  the  firm  can  try  out  the  worker  in a  job  tlat  requires  training. As
suggested  above,  however,  an  untrained  worker  may  have  a negative  (expected)
value  in such  a  job.  Hence,  if  the  potential  damage  is  large,  and  the  firm  is
not  convinced  that  he is  appropriately  trained,  the  firm  may refuse  to employ
an  unknown  worker  in  a  job  requiring  training.
In sum,  the  firm  might  not  offer  an unknown  worker  a job  requiring
training,  and  the  worker,  in  turn,  may  reject  jobs  which  do require  training.
This  blocks  the  inter-firm  movement  of  workers  with  general  training. It
therefore  ensures  firms  will  be prepared  to  finance  some,  or all,  of  a
worker's  general  training.
Thus  far  it  has  been  assumed  that  a  potential  recruiter  is ignorant
of the  probability  that  a  worker  from  a trail,.ng  firm  has  the  appropriate
general  training. The  recruiter  may,  however,  have  some  idea  about  the
proportion  of such  workers  in the  training  firm's  workforce. When  this
probability,  p, equals  unity,  there  is  no asymmetric  information  regarding  Z
(though  uncertainty  regarding  OV remains). Of course,  this  is  unlikely,
especially  given  the  need  to identify  not  just  a  worker  with general  training,
but  the  particular  general  training  that  a trained  workers  possesses.- 9 -
Since  knowledge  of  p constitutes  information,  such  knowledge  may
reduce  the  informational  asymmetry  and  its  consequential  costs.  If  p is  large
and  known  outside  the  training  firm,  both  the  cost  of  each  stage  in the
discovery  process  and  the  expected  length  of this  process  may  be significantl}
reduced. If,  however,  p is small,  knowledge  of p outside  the  firm  will  be of
little  value  to  potential  recruiters.  Hence,  if  information  on  a firm's
training  program  (but  not  information  on individual  trainees)  is likely  to  be
available  to other  firms,  general  training  may  be constrained.  The
proportions  of  workers  trained  in  particular  forms  of Z-enhancing  training,
might  have to  be sub-optimal,  in  order  to  protect  the  firm's  investment  in
training. Given  that  most  firms  are  likely  to require  workers  with  various
types  of general  training,  however,  such  sub-optimality  is  unlikely  to  be
needed.
Even if  the  recruiting  firm  does  eventuall5  discover  a  worker's  Z
it  will  not  know  his  options  value. Observation  of the  worker  in  a given -sk
may  be an  effective,  though  slow  and  expensive,  means  of determining  a
worker's  general  training  for  intended  employment.  The  options  component  of
training  is  unlikely  to  be revealpd  in  this  way. The  options  implicit  in  a
worker's  training  cannot  be determined  by observing  the  worker  in  his intended
job.  Furthermore,  a job  rotation  strategy  means  that  a  worker  would  be doing
jobs  for  which  he is  not currently  needed. Also,  the  discovery  process  for
each  option  will  be similar  in  nature  and  in  length  to  the  process  of
determining  a  worker's  Z.  Information  on a  worker's  OV  will  remain  broadly
unknown  to  a recruiting  firm. Over  and  above  losses  in Zi,  a  worker  moving  to
another  firm  effectively  loses  all  of  his  OV.- 10  -
4.  PAYING FOR GMNERAL TRAINING
The ab-ove  discussion shows that asymmetry in information  will cause
the value of a trained  worker with general training to be highest in his
training firm.  On moving to other firms, a worker's value declines by L,
where L-VT-V... This section examines the relation  between the symmetry of
training information,  the workers' loss of value, and the financing of general
training.
Let T be the cost of a worker's general training. 1W/ Then, if
T>L-VT-VN>O, a training firm  will be willing to pay up to  VT+L-T towards  a
worker's general trainii.-.  The worker will therefore  have to contribute  no
less to than T-L for the training. If the worker were to  move to another firm
he would gain VT-L in income  but forfeit  his training investment,  T-L. Hence,
in a competitive setting, where VT=T, the worker's net gain from moving is
zero. The firm's share in the cost of training  would be no more than L/VT and
poaching would not take place.
The worker must be able to contribute  V-L for  his general training
for the general training to take place. Even if  he is able to contribute  more
than  V-L, however, he will not do so. On the presumption that the training
firm  will only pay him his transfer price, his return to investing in general
training  will not exceed  V-L.  Hence, the minimal proportion of the cost of
general training that a worker will expect his employer to finance is L/VT. If
VT-L>O, therefore, the ratio (VT-L)/L  constitutes the only feasible sharing
scheme  between worker and employer.
If L is  no less than VT, the worker's move to another firm is
blocked.  In this case, the asymmetry of training information  reduces the
value of a worker's general training in potential recruiting firms, to zero.
His wage is, therefore,  no higher than that of an untrained worker.  The- 11  -
implication  is  that  the  training  firm  will  be  prepared  to  pay  for  the  full
cost  of the  worker's  general  training  and  capture  the  full.  return  on the
training  investment.  While  this  is  an extreme  situation,  it is indicative  of
the  efficacy  of asymmetric  information  in  reducing  poaching  and  resurrecting
property  rights  in  general  training  investments.
The  foregoing  analysis  is  captured  in diagrammatic  form  in  Figure  1.
Informational  asymmetry,  Y, (standardized  to  the [0,1]  interval),  is depicted
on the  horizontal  axis. VT and  VN are  measured  along  the  vertical  axis.  The
functions  plotted  in  Figure  1 relate  to increments  in  value  over  that  of
untrained  workers. VT,  representing  both  the  costs  and  the  benefits  of
training  to  the  training  firm,  is invariant  with  respect  to the  informational
asymmetry.  VN(Y),  which  depicts  the  relation  between  Y and  the  value  of a
recruited  trained  worker,  shows  a steep  decline  for  low  values  of
informational  asymmetry  (reflecting  the  almost  inevitable  loss  of  option
values). As Y increases,  VN declines  more  gradually,  reaching  its  lowest
level  when  Y_1,ll/
The  firm  will  be prepared  to invest  up to  L, the  vertical  distance
between  VT and  VN, in  the  general  training  of a  worker. For  example,  at  Y*,
the  training  firm  is  prepared  to  participate  in  a  worker's  general  training  by
AB, requiring  that  the  worker  pays  AY*. An increase  in  the  symmetry  of
training  information  between  training  firms  and  other  firms  will  raise  the
required  share  of the  worker  in  the  training  investment.  If this  information
is fully  and  freely  available  to  other  firms  (as  Y and  L tend  to  zero),  the
worker  will  have  to finance  all  his  training  (OC). This  is  equivalent  to  the
case  described  by Becker,  which  is  seen  to  coincide  with the  special  case  of
perfectly  symmetric  information.  Finally,  if  Y>Y**,  the  value  of a trained
worker  in  a recruiting  firm  will  not  exceed  the  value  of an  untrained  worker.- 12  -
The  worker  will  not invest  in  any  general  training,  whilst  the  training  firm
will  be prepared  to finance  it  fully.
In sum,  for  O<Y<Y**,  training  investment  is shared  by the  worker  and
the  firm. The  worker's  contribution  towards  this  training  for  a given  Y, is
given  by the  distance  between  the  horizontal  axis  and  the VN curve. For
Y>Y**,  general  training  is totally  firm-financed.  The  special  case  of  Becker,
with  a  worker  required  to fully  finance  the  program  of general  training,
occurs  at  Y-0.
5.  WELFARE  AND  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
In  this  section  applications  of the  model  to liquidity  constraints,
to  minimum  wages  legislation  and  to certification  are  discussed.
Liquidity  Constraints
An important  and  much  quoted  implication  of Becker's  model  is  that
potentially  profitable  general  training  investments  might  not  take  place.
Because  of their  inability  to  prevent  workers  from  transferring  to other
firms,  firms  will  not  be prepared  to  finance  general  training. Workers,
however,  may  not  possess  sufficient  funds  nor  be able,  reasonably,  to  obtain
funds  from  intermediates  to  finance  their  training  investment.  Hence,  general
training  may  not  take  place. Also,  if the  general  training  program  is
divisible,  a  worker  may  be able  to  finance  and  purchase  a  part  of it.  In
either  case,  non-investment  or  under-investment  in  general  training  is
predicted.
The  information-based  costs  imposed  on a recruiting  firm  may
mitigate  or resolve  this  potential  problem. This  is illustrated  in  Figure  2.
The  worker's  liquidity  constraint  (AL)  is  parallel  to the  horizontal  axis,- 13-
intersecting  with the  VN curve  where  informational  asymmetry  is  Y*.  In the
case  of symmetric  information,  the  worker  is  able  to finance  only  OA of his
potential  training  investment  OC:  no training  will  take  place  if the  training
program  is indivisible.  Informational  considerations  alter  this  result. As
before,  no training  will take  place  if  Y<Y*.  However,  for  Y*<Y,  the  worker's
liquidity  exceeds  the  VN curve. For  this  range,  the  worker  (while  still
unable  to pay the  full  cost,  OC,  of general  training)  can  finance  his required
share  of training,  VT-L,  without  encountering  a liquidity  constraint.
Asymmetric  information  thus  enables  workers  to  participate  in financing  their
general  training,  despite  a shortage  of  capital  or liquidity.
Minimum  Wages
An additional  source  of a shortfall  in  general  training  may  be the
institution  of legal  minimum  wages. If  set  above  a certain  level,  minimum
wages  will  prevent  the  worker's  wage  from  falling  low  enough  during  traini-S
to  enable  the  firm  to recover  its  training  costs  during  the  training  period
(Leighton  and  Mincer  1979);  the  result  will  be an insufficient  supply  of
general  training  skills  available  to the  economy.
The  presence  of asymmetric  information  may  mitigate  this  effect.
Consider  Figure  3, in  which  information  asymmetry,  Y, is  again  represented  on
the  horizontal  axis  and  various  financial  quantities,  relating  to  the  training
period,  are  plotted  on the  vertical  axis. WO is the  trainee  worker's
opportunity  wage during  his  training  period  and  AB represents  the  cost  of  his
training. The  curve  BD (which  is the  obverse  of  VN in  Figures  1  and  2),
traces  out  the  wage received  by the  worker  during  training,  for  increasing
levels  of  Y.  The  vertical  distance  between  BD and  AWo  measures  the
(diminishing)  required  amount  of  worker  finance,  for  increasing  levels  of  Y.- 14 -
The  Becker  (symmetric  information)  case  is  located  on the  vertical
axis. For  the  case  drawn,  the  firm  cannot  both  recover  its  training  costs  AB
during  the  training  period  while  paying  a  wage  greater  than  OB.  With  a
minimum  wage set  at  Wmini  say,  r.o  general  training  will take  place. The  full
cost  of training  (AB)  must  be  borne  by the  worker;  the  imposition  of a  minimum
wage (Wmin)  at  a level  greater  than  OB,  has  brought  about  a legal  obstruction
to  general  training.
Upon introducing  asymmetric  information,  it  is clear  that,  assuming
the  training  program  is indivisible,  the  minimum  wage  prevents  general
training  investment  from  taking  place  only  for  Y<Y*. Where  Y>Y*,  the  firm
will  be prepared  to finance  an amount  of the  general  training  such  that  the
worker  can  pay  the  rest  via  a lower  wage,  without  contravening  the  minimum
wage laws.
Certification
Finally,  we consider  the  implications  that  our  model  holds  for
educational  certification.  It is  widely  believed  that  an extended  and  more
comprehensive  system  of educational  and  training  certification  is to  be
welcomed,  in that  it leads  to freer  mobility  of  workers  and  an improved,  more
effective,  use  of  human  capital  resources. Such  considerations  underscore  the
national  systems  of  compatible  qualifications  such  as those  currently  being
developed  in  Britain,  and  the  well-established  system  of certification  which
is in  place  in  West  Germany. Yet, the  arguments  presented  in this  paper
suggest  that  certification  may  lead  to less  rather  than  more  general  training,
an effect  that  policy  makers  might  wish  to set  against  the  better  known
advantages  of certification.  The  case  of  West  Germany  may  appear  to
constitute  an  anomaly  here.  Certification  via  in-service  training  is  well-
established,  yet  enterprise-financed  training  is  prevalent. But,- 15  -
institutional  constraints  on inter-firm  poaching  of trained  workers  are
noteworthy  in  West  Germany  (Dougherty  and  Tan,  1990). The  Chambers  of
Commerce,  which  exert  considerable  influence  over  member  firms,  strongly  and
effectively  discourage  competition  for  trained  workers  (Soskice,  forthcoming),
thus  facilitating  enterprise  investment  in  on-the-job  training.
We have  noted  that  asymmetry  in training  information  between
training  and  recruiting  firms  may  lead  to tensions  between  the  interests  of
firms  and  their  trainees. The  trainee  prefers  training  that  is  visible  and
which  generally  identifies  him  outside  the  firm  as  a trained  worker. He will
wish  to enrol  in  training  that  is  capable  of  yielding  these  signals,  which  are
well  achieved  by certificates  of attainment.  The  firm,  on the  other  hand,
will  wish to  minimize  the  amount  of information  generated  about  worker's
training:  this  it  may  do  by avoiding  training  that  is  highly  visible  and  which
may lead  to formal  certification  on completion. 1i/
By reducing  the  extent  of  asymmetric  information  concerning  workers'
trainit,g,  widespread  certification  will  result  in  diminished  scope  for  firms
to  share  in the  financing  of the  general  training  of their  workers.
Certification,  by awarding  workers  property  rights  over  their  general
training,  limits  company  financed  training,  and  places  a  heavier  financing
burden  on  workers.- 16 -
Endnotes
1.  This paper builds on an early presentation of our ideas given in Katz and
Ziderman (1989).
2.  Poverty, low liquidity  and badly functioning  capital markets militate
against the possibility of significant  worker-financed general training.
Becker's result, therefore, implies  a dismal outlook for general training
in developing countries.
3.  See Parsons 1972, Donaldson and Eaton 1976, Hashimoto 1980, Hashimoto and
Yu 1981.
4.  Notable exception are a series of papers on firm-sponsored education
(C.lick  and Feuer, 1984; and Feuer, Glick and Desai, 1985) and the model
of Bishop and Kang (1984).  Unlike our approach, which relates to general
training alone, these are mixed training  models, which show that firm-
financed general training  may take  place in the presence of specific
training.
5.  See  Weisbrod (1962), for a discussion  of some of the option components in
the return to education.
6.  In order to tap these options, firms  will, in general,  have to make a
further,  minor investment  in training (akin  to the exercise price of a
financial  option).  This further required investment  will, however, be
relatively low and the options will materialize quickly.
7.  One particular feature of an option is that its value is an increasing
function  of the randomness  underlying its  use.  In view of the large
amount of randomness that firms in developing  countries typically face,
the option components of V in developing countries  will be particularly
high.
8.  Of course, this information gap is unlikely to have much significance if
the  worker's new employer can quickly and cheaply determine a worker's Z
and OV. In this case the recruiting firm incurs negligible information-
based costs and therefore  puts the same effective  value on a worker as
the firm that trained  him. Under these unlikely circumstances, Becker's
result would hold.
9.  Clearly, it is only the discovery  period that matters.  After this
period, when the recruiting firm  knows the worker's product, the
recruiting firm and the training firm  have the same information  about Z
(though  still not about the worker's option values).
10.  As mentioned in Note 6, a further investment is usually needed to
activate training  options.  Thus, no option values will be revealed in
Table 1.- 17 -
11.  For  each  type  of general  training,  there  is  likely  to  be a corresponding,
but  different,  specific  training  required. Thus,  trying  out  a  worker  in
one  of the  1-1  other  jobs  will  entail  additional  investments  in specific
training,  again  adding  to the  costs  of discovery.
12.  In a  private  communication  (4  Dec.  1989),  Jacob  Mincer  points  out  that  a
trained  worker  has  an incentive  to convey  information  about  his training
to the  recruiting  firm,  which  could  be verified  after  a relatively  short
period. The  central  question,  however,  is  whether  the  trained  worker
would  be  believed,  given  that  untrained  workers  may attempt  to obtain  a
free  ride  by posing  as trained.
13. A discussion  of the  technical  aspects  of such  sampling,  accompanied  by
some  numerical  examples,  is  given  in  Appendix  2.
14.  It is  assumed  here  that  neither  T nor  V are  affected  by the  number  of
workers  trained.
15.  For  the  purposes  of this  illustration  it  is  assumed  that  as the
informational  asymmetry  increases,  ZN tends  to  zero.
16.  This  line  of reasoning  suggests  firms  would  also  try  to  reduce  training
visibility  by refraining  from  writing  references  for  employees  wishing  to
move  to  another  firm. Indeed,  a recent  survey  has shown  that  40  percent
of companies  surveyed  in  the  US have  a formal,  written  policy  not to
provide  outside  references--a  finding  in  conformity  with the  predictions
of  our  model  (NACPR,  1989). Fear  of lawsuits  from  disgruntled  former
employees  who  are  turned  down  for  a  new  job  may  also  help to  explain
employers'  reticence  in  this  matter.- 18  -
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Appendix  1:  Measuring  the  Option  Value  of  Training
Consider  a  general  training  costing  A.  The  main  aim  of this
training  is  to enable  a  worker  to  produce  a  unit  of good  x, which  is the  good
that  the  training  firm  is  currently  producing. The  profitability  of  a unit  of
x produced  by a trained  worker  is  a  constant  equal  to PX.  Furthermore,
depending  on the  way  the  training  is  provided,  it  can indirectly  endow  the
worker  with skills  in  the  production  of one  of two  other  goods,  y or z,
without  additional  costs. It  is  not  profitable  at this  time  to  produce  y or
z.
The  choice  as to  whether  the  indirect  component  of training  should
provide  workers  with  skills  in  producing  good  y or good  z  must  be made  under
uncertainty,  since  neither  the  profitability  of  y nor the  profitability  of z
are  known  at this  time. However,  the  profitabilities  of a  unit  of  y or z (Py
and  P  respectively)  will  be revealed  sometime  after  the  training  nas taken
place.
Py is  a random  variable  and it  is  the  firm's  view that prob(Py  - Py*)
- 1-a  and  prob(Py _ py2) _ a.  Similarly,  Pz is a random variable and the
firm's view is that prob(Pz  P  -)  1  1-b  and  prob(Pz - PZ2)  - b.
Furthermore,
pl  C  <px  < P 2
and  y  y
pzl  <  Px  < pz 2
Hence,  the  training  firm  will  determine  the  indirect  (or  incidental)  aspect  of
the  training  as  providing  a worker  skills  in  producing  y or z according  as  aPy
is  greater  or smaller  than  bPz.  The  option  value,  OV,  in this  case  therefore
is  equal  to  MAX(aPy2  2bPz2.)
Clearly,  this  is  a  highly  simplistic  example. Nonetheless,  one
important  feature  of  options  which  immediately  stands  out  is  that  a- 21  -
mean-preserving  increase  in  spread  raises  the  value  of the  options. Thus if
Py and  P2 are  replaced  by Py - c and  Py +  c,  where  c is  a positive  constant,
the  value  of giving  a  worker  option  Y rises. Over  and  above  the  damage  he
might  cause,  it  will  often  be the  case  that  once  a worker  has  been  employed  as
a trained  worker,  demoting  him  to a  job  not requiring  training  (a  "non-
training  job")  will  encounter  strong  reistance  from  unions  and  other  agencies.
Such  resistance  can  be  very  costly  to  the  firm,  and  playing  it  safe,  the  firm
will initially  employ  the  worker  in  a position  not  requiring  training.- 22 -
A2mendix  2:  Randon  Payoff  Matrix:  A Nunerical  Exaimle
In  this  appendix,  we examine  a payoff  matrix  in  which  the  outputs  of
both trained  aiad  untrained  workers  are  random.
It is  known  to  the  firm  that  a trained  worker's  output  in a  given
job  is el  with  probability  PT  and  e2 with  probability  1 - PT.  Similarly,  an
untrained  worker's  output  in the  same  job is  el  with  probability  PN and  e2
with  probability  1 - PN.  el  and  e2 might  be interpreted  as  success  or failure
at a given  job,  so that  el  - 1,  e2 - 0.  In all  events,  el  >  e2. Furthermore,
the  trained  worker  performs  better  than  the  untrained  worker  at all  jobs  so
that  PT  >  PN.  The  payoff  matrix  for  this  situation  is:
Job  Probability  of  el,  i.e.,  Probability  of e2, i.e.,
Worker  Probability  of  Success  Probability  of Failure
Traine'd  Worker  pT  1 -pT
Untrained  Worker  PN  1 - PN
Payoff  Matrix  Al:
The  firm  decides  that,  based  on the  hypothesis  that  an observed  worker  is
untrained,  it  will  accept  him  as trained  if the  error  of so doing  is  a.
Similarly,  based  on the  hypothesis  that  the  worker  is trained,  it  will  reject- 23 -
that  hypothesis  if  the  error  of doing  so is  b.  In general,  given  the
asymmetry  of  costs  between  assuming  a worker  is  not  trained  and  assuming  he is
trained,  the  firm  will cautiously  choose  a and  b such  that  b >  a.
To determine  the  expected  number  of observations  of a  worker  necessary
before  his status  is  decided  within  the  acceptable  error  limits,  a Sequential
Probability  Ratio  Test  must  be performed.
For  any  one  observation,  the  distribution  of the  outcome  follows  a
Bernoulli  distribution:  Let  x - 0 if  e2 occurs  and  let  x  - 1 if  e1 occurs.
Then  the  outcome  in  any  one  period  of  observation  has  a density  function
fT(X)  - PT(l-PT)lX,  x  - 0,  1
for  a trained  worker,  and
fN(X)  - pX(l_PN)  lX  x  - 0,  1
for  an  untrained  worker.
Defining  Z  as fT(x)/fN(x)  we obtain,
_  (  1 -T  l-x z  _  T  -T
PN  1 PN
so that  lz.Z  - xjn(PT/PN)  +  (l-x)ln((l-PT)/(l-PN))
InZ =  ln(PT/PN) when x =  1 and
lnZ - ln(I-PT)/( 1 -pN) when x - 0.
Using  Wald's  Approximation  (see  DeGroot  1970)  the  expected  number  of
observations  required  to reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no training,  against
the  alternative  hypothesis  of the  worker  being  trained,  is  given  by
E(NNI  no training)  - (aln[i/(l-b)]  +  (l-a)ln[(l-a)/b]  - 2.910
E(ln(Z)l no training  E(lnZl  no training)
whereas  the  number  of observations  it  would  take  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that- 24  -
Appendix Table
NN  NT  Min (NND  NT)
Expected number of  Expected number of
observations  observations
required  to  reject  required  to  reject
the  hypothesis  that  the  hypothesis  that
the worker is  the  worker is
untrained  trained
a - 0.01  a - 0.01  a  - 0.01  a - 0.01  a - 0.01  a - 0.01
b -0.05  b  - 0.10  b - 0.05  b  - 0.10  b  - 0.05  b  - 0.10
-N  - 0.98  932  713  1067  976  932  713
A  PT - 0.99
YN  - 0.90  41  31  29  26  29  26
B  PT - 0.99
MN  - 0-50  8  6  8  7  8  6
C  P,J.  O0.90
PN - 0.25  3  2  4  3  3  2
D  PT  0.90- 25 -
the  worker  is  not trained  when  he,  is given  by
E(NTNI  training)  (b:ln[i/(l-a)I  +  (l-b)ln[(l-b)/a]  - 2.910
E(ln(Z)l training  E(lnZI  training)
The  appendix  table  presents  the  number  of observations  of a  worker,
required  for  different  values  of  PT and  PN,  using  the  typical  a - 0.01,  and  b
- 0.05  or  b - 0.10. NN and  NT are,  respectively,  the  number  of observations
expected  if  the  worker  is  trained  or  untrained.
The  decision  by the  firm  as to  how to  view  a  worker  is  made  when
either  a  or  b reach  a value  smaller  or  equal  to those  decided  upon  by the
firm. If the  appropriate  value  of a is  reached,  the  worker  is  accepted  as
trained. If  the  appropriate  value  of  b is  reached,  the  assumption  that  the
worker  is trained  is rejected  and  he is treated  as  untrained.
Clearly,  cases  A and  B in  the  table  correspond  to  workers  being
employed  in  jobs  which  do not  require  training:  In  these  cases  the  difference
between  a trained  worker's  output  and  an untrained  workers  output  is  small.
Given  the  small  difference  between  the  two  types  of  workers  in  this  type  of
job, it  is  clear  that  they  would  have to  be observed  for  a very  long  time
before  being  assigned  a classification.
In  contrast,  cases  C  and  D are  likely  to relate  to tasks  which
require  training,  this  being  seen  from  the  large  difference  between  the  output
of the  trained  and  untrained  workers.  Given  this  difference,  the  workers  can
be distinguished  with  a small  number  of  observations,  though,  of course,  the
costs  of  mismatching  by putting  an  untrained  worker  into  this  job  is  very
costly.'04
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